United States of America

GA operates in the USA both directly and through the law firm Granato Law and Melchionna PLLC.

 

Granato Law is composed of corporate lawyers with a deep specialisation in technology, media and the creator economy and is distinguished by its extensive knowledge and experience in the technology and media sectors.

 

Melchionna PLLC has great expertise in transactional issues, with relevant focus on regulatory, compliance and M&A/taxation issues.

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News from United States of America

Grimaldi Alliance

Knowledge Management

Apr 11 2025

The new US tariffs regime introduced on April 2, 2025- Focus on the EU

Regulatory landscape and legal basis

On April 2, 2025, the Presidential Executive Order “Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits” (“EO”) introduced a new 10% ad valorem tariff across the board (applicable to all goods with a few exceptions) originating from almost all countries of the world and effective April 5, 2025. The same EO added a reciprocal tariff of an additional 10% ad valorem tariff for goods imported in the US and originating from the European Union, effective April 9, 2025. The EO grounded such new tariffs on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2483), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the U.S.C. From a legal perspective, an EO is not a federal statute but a directive (pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution) that manages operations of the federal government and directs the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Even if the EO has the force of law similar to regulations issued by federal agencies, it cannot contradict existing federal statutes, it is subject to judicial review if unconstitutional (e.g., overturned by the U.S. Court of International Trade and/or by any U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), and it cannot provide federal funding. An EO can be revoked at any moment by another EO and overturned by Congress.

Which branch of the U.S. Government can regulate tariffs? 

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises” and “to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” Only Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate tariffs, unless delegated to the Executive. In the last 50 years or so, Congress has delegated some of this constitutional authority to the U.S. President in case of emergencies. It did so with: (a) The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) to adjust imports if they threaten national security; (b) The Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) to take action against unfair trade practices; and (c) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), to regulate commerce during national emergencies.

Procedure to declare a U.S. national emergency

Each of the federal statutes mentioned above has a procedure that can result in a declaration of national emergency. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) established an emergency procedure initiated by the Secretary of Commerce, by another agency, by industry stakeholders, or by Congress. Such investigations to determine if imports threaten national security can last up to 270 days. If there is a threat, a report is sent to the President with recommendations, and the President has 90 days to decide whether to adjust imports through tariffs or quotas; negotiate agreements with other countries; take other actions deemed necessary; or take no action. Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) can initiate an investigation sua sponte or based on a petition from an industry or from the President. The USTR has 12/18 months to determine if a foreign country's practices are violating trade agreements or if they are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory. If a practice is found unfair, the USTR must determine appropriate action within 30 days, including suspending trade concessions, imposing tariffs or other import restrictions, or entering into binding agreements to eliminate the unfair practice. The IEEPA gives the U.S. President the power to declare a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act but must specify the unusual and extraordinary threat. It must declare that the threat originates wholly or substantially outside the U.S. In that case, the President must immediately transmit the declaration to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register. The President can then investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions; block transfers or transactions involving property of foreign countries/nationals; freeze assets; and/or prohibit imports or exports. The President must consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising such powers. As of today, we have little to no evidence that the U.S. Presidency set in motion the statutory procedures to declare a national economic emergency.

Was the U.S. economy economically and unusually threatened? 

Examples of unusual and extraordinary threats that originate wholly or substantially outside the U.S. (under the IEEPA) are (a) foreign terrorism activities; (b) state-sponsored threats; (c) transnational criminal organizations; (d) cyber threats; (e) weapons proliferation; (f) regional destabilization; (g) global health emergencies; and (h) economic threats (e.g., manipulation of critical resources by foreign governments or foreign government policies that undermine international financial stability). As of today, experts agree that current international economic challenges do not appear to be “unusually and exceptionally” threatening the U.S. economy especially if compared by historical standards (e.g., with reference to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo; the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis; and the 2008 global financial crisis).

Political landscape: What are the goals behind the April 2, 205 EO? 

The EO grounded the new tariffs on the intent to strengthen U.S. national sovereignty because allegedly the U.S. trade deficit is a threat to U.S. sovereignty, justifying the declaration of a “national emergency” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The new tariffs reflect an intent to redefine global trade rules in favor of U.S. interests, challenging the free trade agreements and alliances, and suspending contributions to international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Practically, the EO is a symbolic assertion of strength against foreign nations and a negotiation tool to force foreign nations to accept harsher conditions.

Is the U.S. trade deficit an economic issue for the U.S. economy? 

Before 2025, the U.S. showed clear signs of strength with steady GDP growth and moderate unemployment. The U.S. economy grew by 2.8% in 2024, a slight decrease from the 2.9% growth in 2023. The majority of economists agree that a trade deficit can coexist with a strong economy. The U.S. has maintained trade deficits for decades while experiencing significant economic growth, low unemployment, and technological leadership. The U.S. economy is consumption-driven (roughly 70% of GDP), with Americans having strong purchasing power for global goods.

How to reduce the U.S. trade deficit? 

The majority of the economists agree that to reduce a trade deficit, a multi-pronged and long-term approach is needed, among which are increasing export competitiveness (to improve productivity while providing export assistance and supporting research and development and devaluing currency), improving trade policy, developing import substitutes, and adjusting macroeconomic policies (reducing borrowing from overseas). Policies that could trigger retaliatory measures or disrupt global supply chains should be avoided.

Are new tariffs alone a tool to reduce the U.S. trade deficit? 

Economists agree that a hike in tariffs alone is generally not considered the most effective or appropriate tool for reducing the U.S. trade deficit. While reducing specific imports in the short term, tariffs cause retaliatory measures from trading partners (potentially reducing U.S. exports and nullifying deficit reduction). Tariffs act as a tax on U.S. consumers and businesses (slowing economic growth) and don't address the fundamental macroeconomic factors driving the trade deficit.

What is the next move for the EU? 

While the U.S. economy felt the impact caused by the new EO internally, showing signs of deceleration and inflation (Wall Street lost $6.5 trillion between April 5 and 6, 2025), such an initiative triggered a risk of a global trade war. The EU is planning to reinstate the Suspended Duties policy (effective April 1, 2025) on U.S. goods and plans new tariffs on additional U.S. goods, among which are agricultural (meat, grains), consumer items (dental floss, toilet paper), and luxury products (diamonds).

What is the outcome of a trade war in a 6-month period? 

Based on the current data, in the short term the EU may suffer the impact of such a trade war. However, according to the experts, in the long run, the U.S. may suffer the most from isolation, disruption of the global supply chain, and inflation.

6-month projections losses

  • Economy: GDP Impact
    • EU: -0.8%
    • U.S.: -0.5%
  • Inflation Spike
    • EU: +1.5%
    • U.S.: +2.0%
  • Job Losses
    • EU: 500K
    • U.S.: 300K

What is the next move for U.S. and EU businesses? In order to weather this new uncertain economic time and risk of a trade war, U.S. and EU companies may adopt a number of measures, among which

(a) restructuring the supply chain, e.g., nearshoring/reshoring to tariff-exempt countries;

(b) not relying on China;

(c) introducing customs tactics (e.g., first-sale; HTS reclassification);

(d) anti-coercion measures;

(e) cost-sharing;

(f) commencing litigation before a federal court; and

(g) commencing a serious business plan and implementing a serious acquisition strategy in the U.S.

Grimaldi Alliance

Knowledge Management

Jan 14 2025

How to Manage the New Import Tariffs in the USA

Consequences and Remedies for Italian and European Companies

January 13, 2025 - Prepared by Melchionna PLLC Law Firm, New York

Is there a tangible risk for Italian and European companies exporting goods and services to the U.S., starting January 20, 2025, with the inauguration of the new Trump administration? This question concerns businesses operating in various sectors, including raw materials, manufacturing, fashion, food, beverages and alcohol, mechanics and components, and chemicals, to name just a few.

The Scenario

During his election campaign, Trump stated his intention to target China and Europe and to implement measures similar to those taken during his first administration. At that time, steel and aluminum, for example, were subject to tariffs of 25% and 10%, respectively. This time, however, Trump has pledged to impose generalized protectionist tariffs ranging from 10% to 20%. It is worth noting that Europe has already been threatened with new tariffs if it refuses to import U.S. energy products (coal, oil, and gas). Trump has also declared his intention to introduce 100% tariffs against the “BRIC” bloc (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and UAE) if they decide to adopt a currency competing with the dollar.

1. Economic Forecasts in the Event of New Tariffs for Europe

Initially, new tariffs on goods and services imported into the U.S. would make these products more expensive for American consumers (an aspect that—according to many observers—could politically harm Trump in the long term), thus driving inflation higher.

Regarding the European economy, forecasts indicate that tariffs would further burden an already stagnant economy. According to economists at Citi Bank, undifferentiated 10% tariffs could reduce the GDP of the European area by 0.3% over two years. The value of European companies could decrease by 1% or 2% per share. Both institutional and individual investors have already shown signs of disinvesting from the European area and productive sectors most likely to be affected by tariffs, leading to a further tightening of credit availability. Occasional tariff exemptions would undoubtedly have a political justification.

Germany’s Economic Institute (IW) has calculated that Trump’s new tariffs would cost Germany approximately €180 billion over four years. For the French Center for International Economic Studies (CEPII), Italy is expected to suffer a GDP contraction of 1.20%.

These are the direct impacts. Indirect effects appear even more problematic: Trump’s promise to impose tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese goods could lead Asian companies to divert products initially destined for the U.S. market to Europe, resulting in lower prices for European end consumers and reduced profit margins for many European companies (notably, Chinese electric vehicles currently face a 100% tariff in the U.S.).

The prospect of retaliation is challenging and unlikely, as 25% of goods the EU imports from the U.S. consist of oil, coal, and natural gas—products unlikely to be subjected to new tariffs. The same applies to pharmaceutical products. Europe might consider commercial retaliation against China (as it has in the past), although some goods are already subject to high tariffs (for example, Chinese electric vehicles enter Europe with a 35.3% tariff).

2. What is the Political Scenario?

In U.S. law, only tariffs exist (unlike in Italian law, where both tariffs and duties are distinguished). According to many observers, Trump’s statements on new tariffs, both during and after his campaign, aim to force foreign companies and governments to renegotiate their positions. Tariffs, as is well known, have a political basis. Trump and his team have promoted tariffs through an extensive communication campaign via traditional and digital media, as well as social media. In doing so, they have sought to convince American consumers of the significant domestic benefits that tariffs will bring. However, most experts in economics and economic history do not agree with this prediction.

While Trump currently sees tariffs as an expression of "patriotic protectionism" and, above all, as a powerful tool for geopolitical purposes, it will ultimately be end consumers who decide on the efficacy of this policy. What matters for Italian companies exporting their products to the U.S. is to pay attention to short-term policies and recalibrate their commercial operations based on a clear understanding of the available options to maintain stability and continuity.

3. What Are the Legal Grounds?

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress exclusive authority to legislate on tariffs. However, over time, Congress has delegated this power to the President in certain circumstances. The President could invoke Section 301 of the Trade Act (1974) (as was done for new tariffs on Chinese goods); Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (1962) (as was the case for steel and aluminum imports); or Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which is even faster since it does not require an investigation by federal agencies if the President concurrently declares a national emergency under the National Emergency Act (NEA).

The regulatory framework becomes even more complex when considering the provisions related to tariffs, including exemptions and appeals, sanctions, actions by CFIUS (the U.S. committee overseeing the admissibility of foreign investments), changes to nearshoring rules, and the renegotiation of current bi- or multilateral agreements (especially those with Canada and Mexico).

4. What Are the Impacts and Solutions to Best Prepare?

A significant number of Italian and European companies operating in the U.S. will likely need to assess whether their products and services will be subject to new tariffs. If so, they must quickly decide how to respond. Since the new Trump administration will select goods and services for new tariffs arbitrarily and unpredictably, the response time of affected companies will be crucial for competitiveness and success in the U.S. market. Companies that prepare a response plan today will be able to implement it and successfully navigate the next four years.

Diversified, well-tested, and tailor-made solutions are available.

For further information, please contact Melchionna PLLC Law Firm in New York.

Grimaldi Alliance

Knowledge Management

Oct 22 2024

Corporate Transparency Act Compliance Project

The Corporate Transparency Act (the "CTA") took effect January 1, 2024.

  • Executive Summary
    • The CTA requires every reporting company that is not exempt to file a beneficial ownership report (a "Report") with FinCEN – the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. Treasury. The Report must include five discrete items of information for each Beneficial Owner of your Company. We may require to collect from you documents and information needed to help determine whether your company needs to file a FinCEN Report and, if so, who are the Beneficial Owners to be identified in that report. You will then be responsible for preparing your Report and filing it with FinCEN by the applicable deadline.
    • The CTA imposes a $500 per day fine on reporting companies that fail to file on time. In addition, a willful failure to file can be punished as a felony. If you have any questions, please contact one of our attorneys.

  • Background and Resources
    • Because the CTA is a new law that will require more than 30 million U.S. businesses to file a Report that they have never filed before, there is a great deal of concern is the market.
    • The CTA applies to any corporation, LLC or other legal entity formed by the filing of a document with a Secretary of State (or any entity formed outside the U.S. that is registered to do business in the U.S. by filing a document with a Secretary of State) (each, a "reporting company"). Some reporting companies are exempt from the CTA's requirements and the resources cited below can help you determine if your company may be exempt.
    • The CTA will require every non-exempt reporting company in existence prior to January 1, 2024, to file its initial Report with FinCEN by January 1, 2025.
    • Any company formed on or after January 1, 2024 (and before January 1, 2025), will need to file its first report within 90 calendar days after the date of formation (or the date of registration, in the case of a foreign reporting company).
    • Every non-exempt reporting company will need to identify its beneficial owners and, for each of them, provide their (a) full legal name, (b) residential address, (c) date of birth, (d) a "unique identifying number" (which can be a driver's license or passport) and (e) an image of the document that provides the unique identifying number.
    • Entities formed (or registered to do business in the U.S.) on or after January 1, 2024, will also need to provide this same information for the entity's "company applicant."
    • Importantly, after a reporting company files its initial Report, the reporting company will need to amend that Report within 30 calendar days after any change in its beneficial owners or their reported information. As a result, every reporting company should review its constituent documents and adopt a compliance policy to ensure that the company is able to comply with this requirement.
    • A great source of background information is the Small Entity Compliance Guide (available online) published by FinCEN to educate the market.

  • Assistance in Preparing Your Report Under the CTA.

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